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Protecting Personal Location Data for Private Aircraft Owners 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the E-ZPass system alone, there are over twenty-one million vehicles with individual 
transponders to enable the expeditious payment of tolls on toll roads without cash.
1
 In order for 
E-ZPass to work, the transponder unit, which is tied to the vehicle’s license plate and owner’s 
credit card information, is scanned whenever it passes through a toll collection site and the 
proper toll amount is billed or deducted.
2
 Although the administrating agency, in this case E-
ZPass, can identify which toll booths a vehicle has passed through (in fact it is sometimes 
necessary to know such information in order to charge the appropriate toll), that information is 
not available for the public to see.
3
 In fact, even law enforcement cannot access this information 
without a court order.
4
 Realistically, no reasonable person would expect a private vehicle’s 
location information, namely the toll booths it accessed, to be available to anyone with an 
internet connection. 
 This situation is directly analogous to private aviation. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”) recently proposed a rule that would end an aircraft owner’s ability to 
prevent his movement information from being released to the public.
5
 The program that currently 
allows owners to prevent this release is referred to as Block Aircraft Registration Request 
                                                          
1
 E-ZPass Interagency Group, About Us, E-ZPASS GROUP (2011), http://www.e-zpassiag.com/about-us/overview. 
The EZ Pass system is comprised of agencies from fourteen states in the Northeastern region of the United States, 
including the greater New York area. List of electronic toll collection systems, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 25, 2012 10:24 PM), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_electronic_toll_collection_systems. 
2
 How does E-ZPass® work?, E-ZPASS NEW YORK SERVICE CENTER (2008), https://e-
zpassny.com/en/about/howit.shtml. 
3
 Dan Namowitz, Expanded Aircraft-Tracking Plan Hit as Security Risk, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS 
ASSOCIATION (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.aopa.org/aircraft/articles/2011/110310expanded_aircraft_tracking_hit_as_security_risk.html. 
4
 Most Common E-ZPass Myths, PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE, 
http://www.paturnpike.com/aet_public/ezpass_myths.asp (emphasis added). The time stamps associated with a 
vehicle’s location can only be used for purposes of assessing an accurate fine, and cannot be used to issue speeding 
tickets or other administrative enforcement violations. Id. 
5
 Access to Aircraft Situation Display (ASDI) and National Airspace System Status Information (NASSI), 76 Fed. 
Reg. 12,209 (proposed Mar. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Proposed Rule]. 
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(“BARR”), by which private aircraft owners submit requests to have their information withheld 
from an otherwise automatic-disclosure data feed. The attempt by the FAA constituted a 
violation of personal privacy, and, fortunately, BARR has since been restored.
6
 However, BARR 
is insufficient in its privacy protection for some private aircraft owners due to its functioning as 
an “opt-out” system. Despite functioning to government and industry satisfaction for more than a 
decade, the BARR program should be reconfigured to an “opt-in” system to better align with 
prevailing protections of privacy. 
 This Note treats the movement and location information of private aircraft like that of 
private vehicles; it does not follow that the law should diminish the privacy of one group more 
than the other because it uses federal airspace as opposed to federally-funded highways. Part I 
describes the background and history of the BARR program, as well as describes the recent 
attempt by the FAA to change BARR’s applicability and the lawsuit that challenged this 
decision. Part II analyzes the privacy implications of BARR as it currently exists, in light of pre-
existing federal law, namely the Privacy Act, the Fourth Amendment, and the relevant Freedom 
of Information Act (“FOIA”) provisions. This part will describe how a simple administrative 
change to the program from an “opt-out” to an “opt-in” policy would better reflect the 
government’s current treatment of an individual’s private information, and will suggest the 
alternative solution of removing the personally identifiable information from the released 
information as a means of protecting privacy. Ultimately, the applicable law and relevant 
considerations will lead to the conclusion that, while corporations are sufficiently protected 
under the current system, privacy rights afforded to individual people are likely being infringed 
by BARR and its policy of automatic disclosure. 
 
                                                          
6
 See Background discussion infra Part I. 
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I. Background 
 In the National Airspace System of the United States, all aircraft must choose to fly using 
one of two regulation methods: Visual Flight Rules (“VFR”) or Instrument Flight Rules 
(“IFR”).7 VFR is flying at its most basic, where the pilot is primarily responsible for seeing and 
avoiding all other air traffic and any clouds.
8
 IFR is preferable because: it permits an aircraft to 
fly at altitudes over 18,000 feet,
9
 makes flight possible in most weather and through clouds,
10
  
requires Air Traffic Control to be primarily responsible for separation from other aircraft,
11
 and 
allows for easier Air Traffic Control tracking and coordination.
12
 The vast majority of 
commercial flights (scheduled service provided by airlines) operate using IFR.
13
 In addition, 
many General Aviation (“GA”) users (i.e., non-scheduled, non-commercial flights14) prefer to fly 
under IFR because of the additional flexibility it offers. GA users who fly for transportation 
purposes do not want their travel limited by clouds and weather. Higher altitudes are also 
preferable because smoother air makes for less turbulence, increased fuel efficiency of the 
engines,
 15
 and the absence of VFR traffic that is not permitted above 18,000 feet.
16
 
                                                          
7
 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.101-91.193 (providing for only two sets of rules under which aircraft may be operated). The 
Federal Aviation Regulations (“FARs”) set minimum weather conditions required to fly under VFR; any flights 
occurring during conditions that do not meet those minimums must use IFR if they wish to fly despite the less-than-
ideal weather, unless as otherwise provided in the FARs. 14 C.F.R. § 91.155. 
8
 14 C.F.R. § 91.113. 
9
 Class A airspace is defined as any airspace from 18,000 feet to 60,000 feet. 14 C.F.R. § 71.33 (2011). The FARs 
require any flight operating in Class A to be under IFR. 14 C.F.R. § 91.135. 
10
 Id. 
11
 14 C.F.R. § 91.173. 
12
 Flight following is where ATC assigns a transponder code to an IFR flight, which allows for easy handoffs 
between controllers and easy tracking of the flight on the radar screens. This practice also makes it easier for Air 
Traffic Controllers to give in-flight traffic advisories to the pilots. 14 C.F.R. § 121.125. 
13
 Interview with Edward Bradley, Member & Pilot, Air Line Pilots Association, in Jersey City, N.J. (Oct. 12, 2011). 
14
 “The Federal Aviation Administration defines general aviation as all flights that are not conducted by the military 
or the scheduled airlines.” What is Business Aviation?, NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION (2012), 
http://www.nbaa.org/business-aviation/. 
15
 See Bradley, supra note 13 
16
 Id.; see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.135. 
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 In order to fly using IFR, the pilot must file an official flight plan prior to departure.
17
 
The information typically contained in a flight plan includes the origin and destination airports; 
anticipated altitude and airspeed; expected departure and arrival time; planned route utilizing 
navigational aids; fuel usage; alternate destinations if the weather is questionable; pilot’s 
name(s); and number of people on board.
18
 The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) 
collects this data and uses it for safety and airspace management purposes. Combined with radar, 
this data allows the FAA to monitor the progress of flights in real time through a network called 
Aircraft Situation Display (“ASDI”).19  
 In addition to using ASDI for air traffic control, the FAA also shares it with public and 
private entities upon request.
20
 This system provides a real-time feed of the nation’s airspace to 
Class One subscribers such as commercial airlines and near-real time feed (meaning typically a 
delay of about five minutes from current airspace positions) to Class Two subscribers.
21
 This 
relationship between the FAA and the subscribers is governed by a Memorandum of Agreement 
(“MOA”), entered into individually with each subscriber. 22  Any member of the public can 
request to become a Class Two subscriber and receive the near-real time stream of the present 
location of airborne aircraft.
23
 The most common Class Two subscribers are commercial 
websites, such as www.FlightAware.com (“FlightAware”),24 who then make that information 
available to anyone with an internet connection. The practical result of this system is that all of 
                                                          
17
 14 C.F.R. § 91.169; see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.153 (listing the requirements for a VFR flight plan, if the pilot were to 
opt to file one, even though it is not required to do so).  
18
 14 C.F.R. § 91.169. 
19
 Block Aviation Registration Request (BARR) Program, NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION (May 9, 
2011), http://www.nbaa.org/ops/security/barr/background/ [hereinafter Background of the BARR Program]. 
20
 Id. 
21
 Proposed Rule, supra note 5 at 12,210. 
22
 Background of the BARR Program, supra note 19. 
23
 Memorandum of Agreement, Version 1.4, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 2, 
http://www.fly.faa.gov/ASDI/asdidocs/ASDI_MOA_Ver_1.4_07212011.pdf. 
24
 Home Page, FLIGHTAWARE (2012), www.flightaware.com. 
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the flight plan data mentioned above can be seen by the general public on various websites with 
present locations tracked in near-real time.
25
 In addition, websites like FlightAware also save the 
data to create a comprehensive history of a particular aircraft, airport, or frequent flight.
26
 
 Very quickly after this data became available to the public over the internet, both industry 
users and government officials recognized the privacy or confidentiality issue for GA owners 
and operators posed by the dissemination of data.
27
 In response to this concern, Congress 
included language in the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st 
Century (“AIR 21”) that required all ASDI subscribers to have the capability to selectively block 
the display of information for certain aircraft requested by the FAA.
28
 In order for an aircraft 
owner to prevent his flight data from being released, he had to submit a request to the National 
Business Aviation Association (“NBAA”), which compiled a list of requests and sent monthly 
updates to the FAA.
29
 This list would become the “blocked list” of aircraft whose movements 
would not be visible to the public, by request of the FAA as provided for in the MOA.
30
 Under 
this program, known as Block Aircraft Registration Request (“BARR”), only non-commercial 
flights may submit requests to have their travel information protected. BARR greatly appealed to 
all types of GA flights, ranging from businesses or corporations trying to keep secret a CEO’s 
travels, to aircraft-owning celebrities looking for a paparazzi-free getaway, to individual citizens 
who simply did want others to be able to track their constant location.
31
 
                                                          
25
 Frequently Asked Questions, FLIGHTAWARE (2012), http://flightaware.com/about/faq.rvt. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Background of the BARR Program, supra note 19. 
28
 Wendel H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 106-181, § 729, 114 Stat. 
168 (Apr. 5, 2000) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §44103 note). 
29
 Background of the BARR Program, supra note 19.  
30
 Id. 
31
 Chad Trautvetter, AIN Blog: FAA Should Leave BARR Alone, AIN ONLINE (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://www.ainonline.com/?q=aviation-news/blogs/ain-blog-faa-should-leave-barr-alone. 
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 The BARR program operated effectively for fourteen years through collaboration with 
the NBAA, providing ADSI subscribers with access to flight tracking information, but also 
allowing for the privacy of those who requested it to be protected.
32
 In March 2011, the FAA 
issued a Notice of Proposed Modification to the FAA/Subscriber MOA (“proposed rule”) in the 
Federal Register, which described how it intended to modify the MOA with ASDI subscribers in 
order to change its interpretation of what it would “request” to be blocked. 33  The agency 
proposed that it would no longer accept requests for an undisclosed or generalized reason; rather, 
it would permit an aircraft to be blocked only if the owner annually submitted an approved Valid 
Security Concern.
34
 This change effectively reversed FAA recognition that privacy rights were 
implicated by the ASDI program; in fact, the FAA specifically noted as much in the proposal.
35
 
After a legally sufficient comment period and time for revisions based on those comments, the 
FAA issued its Notice of Modification to the FAA/Subscriber MOA (“final rule”) on June 3, 
2011, which had the effect of making the proposed regulation final.
 36
 The final rule took effect 
August 2, 2011, sixty days after its issuance in the Federal Register.
37
 
 The comments to the proposed rule were very one-sided. Of the 621 comments that were 
submitted, only twenty expressed complete support for the proposal.
38
 Out of these twenty, some 
do not specify a reason for their support, and only a handful appear to come from someone 
familiar with the industry.
39
 The main reasons given in support of the proposal was to limit a 
corporation’s ability to deceitfully use its aircraft and to increase public oversight and monitoring 
                                                          
32
 Background of the BARR Program, supra note 19. 
33
 Proposed Rule, supra note 5 at 12,210. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Access to Aircraft Situation Display (ASDI) and National Airspace System Status Information (NASSI), 76 Fed. 
Reg. 32,258 (June 3, 2011) [hereinafter Final Rule]. 
37
 Id. 
38
 See Comments to Access to Aircraft Situation Display (ASDI) and National Airspace System Status Information 
(NASSI), 76 Fed. Reg. 12,209 (proposed Mar. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Comments]. 
39
 Id. 
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of corporate aviation.
40
 The opponents of the regulation, in addition to being significantly more 
numerous, provided considerably more in-depth responses and reasoning that examined relevant 
factors on both sides of the issue.
41
 Despite varying significantly in wording and validity, some 
of the bases for opposing the proposed rule included: procedural insufficiency; additional 
administrative burden on both industry and FAA; the public benefit derived against the privacy 
concerns; the lack of government activity actually being disclosed; loss of competition; detriment 
to safety; terrorism; disparate treatment as opposed to automobiles; and the precedent this change 
would set.
42
 FlightAware.com, one of the more prominent ASDI subscribers, in fact opposed the 
proposed change, stating that “[a]lthough the proposed change would stand to financially benefit 
FlightAware, we oppose the change on the basis that it is misguided, overly broad and 
simplified, and would negatively impact the transportation sector as well as the US economy at 
large.”43  
 Since President Obama took office, there has been an influx of open-government 
initiatives.
44
 Spanning executive agencies and offices all the way up to the President, the current 
                                                          
40
 Id.  
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Comment to Access to Aircraft Situation Display (ASDI) and National Airspace System Status Information 
(NASSI), 76 Fed. Reg. 12,209 (proposed Mar. 4, 2011) (comment of FlightAware). 
44
 See generally Transparency and Open Government, Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment; Freedom of Information Act, 
Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FreedomofInformationAct; Open Government Plan, 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (Apr. 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.dot.gov/open/pdf/DOT_Open_Gov_Plan_V1.2_06252010.pdf; Open Government Directive, 
Memorandum from Office of Management and Budget for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Dec. 
8, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf; The 
Freedom of Information Act, Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 
(Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf. Also, the OPEN Government 
Act of 2007 was passed with the same intent, however it was passed and enacted prior to President Obama taking 
office. Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007. Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 
2524 (2007). 
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administration places high importance on disclosure of government information.
45
  In fact, a 
Presidential Memo regarding FOIA instructs agencies to “take affirmative steps to make 
information public,” and that “[t]hey should not wait for specific requests from the public” to do 
so.
46
 Based on this administrative setting, the FAA claimed in its Final Notice that it decided to 
take this action to be more aligned with the prevailing executive policy.
47
  
 An additional trigger brought the issue of BARR’s “secrecy” to the attention of the FAA: 
a recent FOIA request that led to a “reverse-FOIA” legal challenge to prevent the requested 
information from being disclosed.
48
 While a typical FOIA action is brought by a non-
governmental party seeking to compel the government to disclose information, a reverse-FOIA 
action is brought by an entity seeking to enjoin the government from making a disclosure.
49
 In 
this case, a media outlet requested a list of the aircraft tail numbers whose movements were 
being blocked by BARR.
50
 The outlet, a “non-profit news organization[,]” claimed, as the basis 
for its FOIA request, an “interest in investigating and reporting on politicians’ use of private 
aircraft, the use of private jets by corporations that have accepted taxpayer dollars from the U.S. 
government during the recent recession, and the environmental impact of aircraft use.”51 Upon 
notice from the FAA that it was preparing to release the block list, the NBAA instituted the 
reverse-FOIA action to prevent the release.
52
 Finding that no exclusion under FOIA applied to 
                                                          
45
 Id. 
46
 Freedom of Information Act, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 
4683, Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://federalregister.gov/a/E9-1773. 
47
 Proposed Rule, supra note 5 at 12,210; Final Rule, supra note 26 at 32,260-61. 
48
 See Nat’l Bus. Aviation Ass’n v. Fed. Aviation Admin. (“NBAA v. FAA”), 686 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2010). 
49
 "‘A person whose information is about to be disclosed pursuant to a FOIA request may file a reverse-FOIA action 
and seek to enjoin the Government from disclosing it.’" Id. at 84, quoting Canadian Commercial Corp. v. Dep't of 
Air Force, 514 F.3d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). 
50
 NBAA v. FAA, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 84. 
51
 Id. at 83 n.5. 
52
 Id. at 83-84. 
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the subject information, the District Court of D.C. mandated the FAA release the list.
53
 This case, 
combined with at least one other isolated incident of corporate CEO travel being made public,
54
 
generated negative publicity for the FAA,
55
 ultimately causing it to initiate a change to BARR. 
 The change to BARR that disallowed the blocking of movement information without a 
specific, verifiable security concern was vehemently opposed by various industry groups. The 
NBAA, in conjunction with the Aircraft Owner’s and Pilot’s Association (AOPA) filed a lawsuit 
challenging the procedural sufficiency of the Final Rule,
56
 with a supporting amicus curiae brief 
filed by the Experimental Aircraft Association.
57
 The FAA had already filed its reply brief and a 
date for oral arguments had been set for December 2, 2011, when the lawsuit was rendered 
moot.
58
 On October 31, 2011,
59
 Congress passed the Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act of 2012, which included a provision that effectively returned BARR to its 
original operation.
60
 This congressional action came after numerous other bills had been 
introduced into both the House and Senate in order to explicitly overturn the FAA’s action.61 
                                                          
53
 Id. at 87. However, the request was only for the list of aircraft that were being blocked; it did not request any 
movement information about the aircraft, a distinction that the court noted in its opinion. 
54
 When the recent economic crisis hit the automobile industry in 2009, the CEOs of GM, Chrysler, and Ford flew 
on their corporate jets to Washington D.C. in order to ask Congress for bailout money. This seemingly fiscally 
irresponsible act caused outcry among taxpayers. As a result of the intensified scrutiny of how it was using its 
corporate jet, GM submitted the tail number of its aircraft to have its movements blocked from public view. This act 
of requesting to be blocked, in itself, also spawned media attention and brought the BARR program into the public 
spotlight, where it was immediately viewed in a negative light due to the surrounding circumstances. John Hughes & 
Elliot Blair Smith, GM Asks U.S. FAA to Bar Public Tracking of Leased Corporate Jet, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 
2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=afrKemH3i.2Y. 
55
 See, e.g., Id.; Michael Grabell, Business Jet Group Tries to Block FOIA Request, PROPUBLICA (June 17, 2009), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/business-jet-group-tries-to-block-foia-request-616. 
56
 Nat’l Bus. Aviation Ass’n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. 11-1241 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 29, 2011). 
57
 Brief for Experimental Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nat’l Bus. Aviation Ass’n v. 
Fed. Aviation Admin., No. 11-1241 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 29, 2011). 
58
 See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, § 119A, 125 Stat. 552 
(2011). 
59
 Signed by President Obama into law on November 17, 2011. 
60
 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, supra note 56. The relevant paragraph actually 
prohibits the FAA from using any of its appropriated funds for programs that purport to limit the ability of 
individual aircraft owners to request that their privacy be protected. Id. 
61
 See generally FAA Reauthorization Act of 2011, H.R. 658, 112th Cong. § 817 (2011) (BARR preservation was 
built in as part of the reauthorization); BARR Preservation Act of 2011, S. 1477, 112th Cong. (2011); BARR 
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 While restoring BARR to its status prior to the FAA’s change is definitely a step towards 
better protection of personal privacy, it is not enough. The FAA should amend BARR in the 
opposite direction: rather than permitting aircraft owners to submit requests to block their 
movement information, it should automatically block all private movement information until the 
owner has submitted a request to have it publicly displayed. Alternatively, the same 
governmental disclosure interests in disclosing all the data would be achieved by the less-
intrusive system of releasing movement information without the tail number attached.  
 People do not need a specific reason to want their personal information to remain private. 
This fundamental principle is reflected in BARR’s operation: general aviation users who wish to 
have their flight data blocked from public view can submit merely a bare-bones request to be 
blocked without giving a supporting reason.
62
 While it is concededly easy to have the 
information blocked or removed from public display, the fact that disclosure is automatic until a 
request is submitted is the problem. Private aircraft owners could suddenly encounter a situation 
in which they would like the flight data to not be available online. Unfortunately for this owner, 
the block request process takes a month or more to become effective,
63
 and any privacy, security, 
or safety concerns that might arise with little notice will go unaddressed. 
II. Analysis 
 
 Individual owners of aircraft should be entitled to privacy in their flight movements the 
same way drivers are protected from release of their tollbooth data. There are multiple federal 
laws with which the BARR program could be found incompatible. This Part will focus on the 
Privacy Act, FOIA, and a possible connection to the Fourth Amendment. When assessing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Preservation Act of 2011, H.R. 2897, 112th Cong. (2011). Although not identical in wording to the provision in the 
FAA Reauthorization Act, the BARR Preservation Act in both Houses was very similar and would have had the 
same ultimate practical effect. 
62
 See Background of the BARR Program, supra note 19. 
63
 Background of the BARR Program, supra note 19. 
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whether any of these laws are implicated by BARR, it is important to consider to whom the 
federal laws extend protection. For example, the Privacy Act protects government-held personal 
information of individual people, but whether similar protections apply to corporate entities is 
less clear.
64
  Therefore, this Part will address the applicability of each of these laws in addition to 
the type of aircraft owner that would be entitled to possible protection. 
A. The Privacy Act 
 
  The Privacy Act was enacted for the purpose of protecting personal records that are 
either collected and/or maintained by the government from being released to the public.
65
 At its 
most basic function, the Privacy Act serves to “provide certain safeguards for an individual 
against an invasion of personal privacy.”66 In passing the Act, Congress recognized that privacy 
is a fundamental basis of our society, and individuals should be automatically entitled to 
protection until a prevailing cause mandates otherwise.
67
 The Privacy Act defines “record” as 
“any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an 
agency,”68 and protects records from disclosure to any person or other agency without prior 
consent from the individual about whom the record is maintained.
69
 Even from just the plain 
language of the Act, the flight movement data clearly fit the definition of “record,” and thus 
should be entitled to protection. Information supplied on a flight plan by an aircraft owner to the 
FAA, and the compilation of that movement data, should be considered a “grouping” of 
information sufficiently “about an individual.”70 
                                                          
64
 See discussion of Privacy Act infra Part IIA. 
65
 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974). 
66
 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974). 
67
 Id. 
68
 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (2010). 
69
 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). 
70
 See id. 
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 Any remaining doubt about whether the aircraft movement data is sufficiently “about” 
the aircraft owner should be dispelled by appreciating how simple it is to connect the aircraft tail 
number with its owner. The FAA Aircraft Registry, a database of all aircraft registered in the 
United States, is available, free of charge, on the FAA website.
71
 The database can be searched 
by tail number, owner, state of registration, and more.
72
 Effectively, anyone who already has the 
tail number of an aircraft can use this website to find the owner and vice versa.
73
 Therefore, any 
aircraft data that can be retrieved using the tail number should also be considered to be a 
“record” of the owner under the Privacy Act. 
 The Privacy Act protects “system[s] of records,”74 which include records that can be 
retrieved based on the individual’s name or any identifying number assigned to the individual.75 
This data should be protected from disclosure is because the tail number of the aircraft, being 
registered in the name of the owner (and with that registration information being so readily 
ascertainable online), should be considered an identifying number assigned to that individual, the 
owner. Because the movement data can be retrieved based on a tail number, which is for all 
intents and purposes equivalent to the owner’s name, 76  the ASD database containing the 
movement information should be considered a “system of records” and used within the Privacy 
Act. 
 In its Proposed Rule and Final Rule, the FAA claimed that Privacy Act does not cover the 
disclosure that the intended modification to the MOA would have made while offering very little 
                                                          
71
 FAA Registry, Aircraft Inquiry, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (last visited Mar. 6, 2012), 
http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/. 
72
 Id. Other search parameters include the make and model of the aircraft, county or country of registration, serial 
number of the aircraft, engine registration number, and recent registrations via the aircraft manufacturer. 
73
 Id. 
74
 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). 
75
 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4). 
76
 See FAA Registry, supra notes 69-70. 
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explanation as to why this is so.
77
 The Final Rule cited to the relevant part of the MOA by simply 
quoting “‘[t]he protection of such information is not covered under the Privacy Act….’”78 
However, neither the Final Rule nor the MOA describe why this is true.  
 The only explanation offered in the Final Rule is that “[a]ircraft registration information 
(including aircraft type, current status and ownership of aircraft, registration number, etc.) is in a 
System of Records protected by the Privacy Act.”79 This reference to the Privacy Act seems to 
suggest that this database is permitted to be disclosed by an exception to the Privacy Act. 
However, the System Notice DOT/FAA 801 being referred to by the FAA does not encompass, 
or even contemplate, the movement data that is the subject of the current challenge.
80
 Rather, as 
required in the Privacy Act,
81
 the System Notice merely registers and delineates the scope and 
purpose of the FAA’s Aircraft Registry database, 82  which is limited to the aircraft owner, 
description, registration, and airworthiness specifications.
83
 This Aircraft Registry is a separate 
database that makes public registration information pertaining to all civil aircraft registered in the 
United States,
84
 and should not be confused with the movement and location information 
presently at issue. In essence, it appears that the FAA assumed disclosure is not precluded by the 
Privacy Act by claiming reliance on a separate, inapplicable exemption from the Act.
85
 Although 
the FAA may have been mistaken, as a practical matter, however, a challenge to the disclosure of 
movement information under the Privacy Act never would have needed to happen, as any 
                                                          
77
 Proposed Rule, supra note 5 at 12,210; Final Rule, supra note 26 at 32,263. 
78
 Final Rule, supra note 26 at 32,263. It should be noted that the MOA is not legal authority in itself, as it is just an 
agreement between the FAA and the direct subscribers to the ASD information. The FAA was also the original 
drafter of the MOA, so it effectively cited itself for support in its Final Rule. 
79
 Id. 
80
 System of Records, DOT/FAA 801, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,518 (Apr. 11, 2000) (merely providing for the storage of 
records pertaining to aircraft owners and registration). 
81
 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). 
82
 See System of Records, supra note 78. 
83
 See FAA Registry, supra notes 69-70. 
84
 Id. 
85
 See Final Rule, supra note 26 at 32,263. 
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individual who is adversely affected by a disclosure had the much simpler and cheaper option of 
submitting a BARR request. 
 In a Preliminary Report on modern-day privacy, the Federal Trade Commission noted 
that location-based information “raises important privacy concerns” because, for example, “the 
retention of location information about a consumer’s visits to a doctor’s office or hospital over 
time could reveal something about that consumer’s health that would otherwise be private.”86 
This language shows regulatory recognition of an interest in keeping the sum total of one’s 
locations and destinations a secret if one so chooses. This principle should also be applied to 
location information that can be ascertained from making flight data available to the public. 
 Proponents of the modification to BARR pointed to the fact that the flight data to be 
disclosed stops tracking the individual’s movement at the airport, and it is impossible to tell 
where any passengers go from there. However, the only difference between the example in the -
FTC report and the ASDI flight data is the specificity. If an aircraft flies into an airport, an 
observer does not necessarily know where the passenger’s final destination is, as the tracking 
ends as the passenger leaves the aircraft at the airport instead of at the doctor’s office. 
Realistically, however, coupling the airport destination information with other known 
information may make it clear where the passenger is headed after deplaning. Without knowing 
the destination, there would be no way of discerning the information.  
 Although at first it may seem speculative to actually be able to draw these connections, 
the Wall Street Journal has already demonstrated, with much bravado, that it can be done.
87
 For 
                                                          
86
 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 47 (Dec. 2010). 
87
 The Wall Street Journal published an article that included specific aircraft owners, names of individuals, the 
number of flights to particular destinations, and estimates of the costs of flights. Mark Maremont & Tom McGinty, 
For the Highest Fliers, New Scrutiny, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 21, 2011), available at 
http://m.india.wsj.com/s/4150/388?articleId=SB10001424052748703551304576260870733410758&fullStory=fullS
tory. The authors also created an interactive webpage on the WSJ website to aid readers in searching for a particular 
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example, by simply knowing that actor John Travolta is a member of the Church of Scientology 
and being able to ascertain that his private aircraft was flown repeatedly to Clearwater, Florida 
(the headquarters of the Church), the Wall Street Journal article came to the conclusion that 
Travolta visited the Church headquarters 111 times in four years.
88
  
 Even if the records were not subject to protection under the Privacy Act, existing federal 
laws indicate an overwhelming public policy interest to the contrary. The existence of the 
Privacy Act (section 552a), conveniently next to FOIA (section 552), shows Congress has 
recognized a distinction between “[p]ublic information[,] agency rules, opinions, orders, records, 
and proceedings”89 and “[r]ecords maintained on individuals,”90 and has chosen to protect the 
latter.
91
 There have been many other statutes enacted in various regulatory fields that show 
similar Congressional intent.
92
 When read together with this myriad of other statutes, the Privacy 
Act shows Congress’ expressed interest in protecting personal data from government disclosure, 
to which BARR’s opt-out system barely pays respect. 
 On the contrary, altering BARR to allow disclosure only when a party opts-in to the 
disclosure seems much more in line with the congressional intention, and will better protect 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
aircraft or owner and their flight histories. Jet Tracker, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (last accessed March 6, 2012), 
http://projects.wsj.com/jettracker/#a=&d=&e=2011-01-01&m=grouped&o=&p=0&s=2007-01-
01&sort=d&t=&v=table. This website was created based on data obtained from the FAA’s ASDI system. 
88
 Id. 
89
 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009). 
90
 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
91
 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552; 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
92
 See Comment to Access to Aircraft Situation Display (ASDI) and National Airspace System Status Information 
(NASSI), 76 Fed. Reg. 12,209 (proposed Mar. 4, 2011) (comment of the National Business Aviation Association) 
(citing the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act, the Telephone Consumer protection Act of 1991, the Internal Revenue Service 
confidentiality requirements in 26 U.S.C. § 6103, the Health Insurance Probability and Accountability Act, the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, the Cable Communications Policy Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, the Gramm-Leach Bliley 
(Financial Services Modernization Act), the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing 
Act, and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act); Final Rule, supra note 26 at 
32,260-61 (same). 
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owners from the default-disclosure in unforeseen situations that require privacy.
93
 For example, 
even though BARR as an opt-out system allows aircraft owners to submit a request that would 
take effect up to two months later, it does not protect individuals who become the victim of 
stalking with no notice, as with John and Martha King.
94
 The Kings own a pilot-training school 
and became aware, after-the-fact, that someone had been tracking where their aircraft were 
located, and from that information, could tell when they were not at home.
95
 Had BARR been an 
opt-in system prior to this occurrence, thereby requiring the Kings to give consent for the FAA to 
release their data, they would have had the opportunity to consider possible consequences of 
disclosure such as this type of stalking. 
 Whether businesses and corporations qualify as “individuals”96 under the Privacy Act is 
not yet settled; however the law seems to be leaning towards the negative answer.
97
 If a business 
does not qualify for “individual” status, it will therefore not qualify for Privacy Act protections, 
as only “individuals” are afforded protection. 98  In Cell Associates v. National Institutes of 
Health, the Ninth Circuit found that corporations do not have standing to sue under the Privacy 
                                                          
93
 The Privacy Act states that “[n]o agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by 
any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with 
the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (emphasis added) 
94
 See Comment to Access to Aircraft Situation Display (ASDI) and National Airspace System Status Information 
(NASSI), 76 Fed. Reg. 12,209 (proposed Mar. 4, 2011) (anonymous commenter, titled Five Compelling Reasons 
Why Government Policy Should Not Trample Privacy and Security); BARR Program in Jeopardy, NATIONAL 
BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.nbaa.org/ops/security/barr/impact/king-schools.php. 
95
 Id. 
96
 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (defining “record” by using the term “individual”); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) (defining 
“individual”). 
97
 “[The] term ['individual'] is used instead of the term 'person' throughout the bill in order to distinguish between the 
rights which are given to the citizen as an individual under this Act and the rights of proprietorship, businesses and 
corporations which are not intended to be covered by this Act.” Stone v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 
552 F.2d 132, 137 n.7 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 79 (1974), interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2)). See OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 550 (N.D. Tex. 
1978) (“An ‘individual’ is defined by the Act as a ‘citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence.’ ‘This definition is intended to distinguish between the rights which are given citizens and 
individuals under this Act as opposed to the rights of proprietorships, businesses, and corporations which are not 
intended to be covered by the Act.’”), quoting Privacy Act Guidelines, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 40 
Fed. Reg. 28,951 (July 9, 1975) (internal citation omitted). 
98
 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2), (4). 
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Act.
99
 The Supreme Court also recently found that corporations are not entitled to “personal 
privacy”;100 however, that was held within the context of FOIA’s exemption 7,101 and is not 
directly applicable to the Privacy Act. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has also held that a 
corporation was entitled to constitutional protection similarly to a natural person.
102
 Ultimately, 
while the Privacy Act and any protection of flight data it provides may or may not apply to 
aircraft-owning businesses also, it at least should apply to private, natural-person owners whose 
aircraft are flown under IFR using flight plans.  
B. The Fourth Amendment Provides a Standard for Privacy in the Civil Context 
 
 To make the argument that “concerns about warrantless surveillance are not relevant” to 
a disclosure of this nature, the FAA cited to United States v. Knotts,
103
 a 1983 Supreme Court 
case discussing the use of electronic surveillance as a substitute for physical following.
104
 In 
Knotts, the Court found, it permissible for the police to use a radio transmitter that, once affixed 
to the suspect’s vehicle, enabled the police to follow the vehicle.105 The supporting reasoning 
relied upon by the FAA was that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”106 
 However, the high court also recently handed down a decision in another surveillance 
case, United States v. Jones,
107
 this time discussing law enforcement’s use of a GPS device to 
                                                          
99
 579 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1978). 
100
 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. AT&T, Inc. (FCC v. AT&T), 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1187 (2011). 
101
 Id. 
102
 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (following extensive precedent that finds 
First Amendment protection to apply to speech regardless of whether it came from a corporation or a natural 
person). 
103
 460 U.S. 276 (1983).  
104
 Final Rule, supra note 26 at 32263 n.2. 
105
 The technology in Knotts consisted of a transmitter, attached to the suspect’s vehicle, and a receiver in the police 
vehicle. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277, 282. 
106
 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
107
 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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continually monitor a suspect’s whereabouts.108 In Jones, the Court affirmed the judgment of the 
D.C. Circuit in United States v. Maynard.
109
 The facts of Maynard rested upon the use of GPS 
tracking as a substitute for physical police surveillance for twenty eight days.
110
 Writing for the 
court, Judge Ginsberg explained that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements over a period of time,
111
 which is distinguishable from the lack of expected privacy 
in a more time-limited movement from one place to another.
112
 In affirming the D.C. Circuit, 
however, the Supreme Court focused its analysis of the issue on the attachment and use of the 
GPS unit to the defendant’s vehicle,113 which the Court found to be an unconstitutional search.114 
In doing so, the Court expressly did not rule on the issue of whether continual electronic 
observation is constitutionally permissible.
115
 Even in affirming the Circuit court’s judgment 
Jones did not overrule Knotts, because, as Jones notes,
116
 the Knotts Court expressly reserved the 
issue of whether continual surveillance for a case that actually brought the issue before the 
Court.
117
 
 Knotts was decided before advanced technology became so prevalent in our society, and 
the Court did not foresee the possibility of a case such as Maynard.
118
 Also, the holding in Knotts 
heavily rested on the fact that any member of the public, or a police officer, can easily follow a 
                                                          
108
 Id. at 948. 
109
 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
110
 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555. 
111
 Id. at 544. 
112
 Id. at 558. 
113
 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948, 952. 
114
 The court noted how the government, through the police, had converted the use and functionality of Jones’s 
vehicle through the attachment and use of the GPS transponder. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958. 
115
 Id. at 953-54 (“[O]ur cases suggest that such visual observation is constitutionally permissible. It may be that 
achieving the same result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.”). 
116
 Id. at 952 n.6. 
117
 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284 (“If such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should 
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be 
applicable.”). 
118
 Id. at 283 (the “reality [of its holding] hardly suggests abuse”). 
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driver on public roads.
119
 However, this is not true in the case of an aircraft: it is extremely 
infeasible, if not completely impossible, to “follow” an aircraft, either in the air or on the ground, 
as it flies through public airspace.
120
  
 Obviously, the privacy rights discussed in these cases are markedly factually 
distinguishable from the privacy interests in keeping aircraft flight information undisclosed. 
Jones was decided in a criminal context, where the government was trying to use the GPS-
derived location data against him in court. The ASD location data is not gathered by or for law 
enforcement, and there is no argument against the government collecting the data as there is in a 
criminal context; rather, the issue is what the government does with the data after the collection. 
However, in both contexts the issue of GPS-derived data and the detailed accounting of an 
individual’s life that this type of data can reveal are present. Also, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged on many occasions the fact that Fourth Amendment protections should also apply 
in a civil setting.
121
 In Soldal v. Cook County, the Court expressly reaffirmed the “basic 
understanding that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures fully applies in the 
civil context.”122 Therefore, the level of protection given in the criminal context should serve as a 
standard for privacy in other settings with similar facts and interests, like with the ASD data. 
 Fourth Amendment protections and warrant requirements can be waived if the individual 
whose privacy is at issue consents to the government’s action.123 When the government is relying 
                                                          
119
 Id. at 281-82. 
120
 Air Traffic Control does not provide directions and separation to an aircraft that doesn’t have a destination; the 
pilot of the aircraft has to request a clearance to a certain direction, which the Controller will do his best to comply 
with. See generally 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.1-91.219.  Even if it were possible to listen to radio communications between 
the first pilot and Air Traffic Control to ascertain where he is headed, the second pilot would need to know about 
how far he expect to fly so he can have an appropriate amount of fuel on board. 
121
 See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 67 (1992). 
122
 Id.at 67 n.11. 
123
 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
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on an individual’s consent as a waiver, the consent must be knowingly and voluntarily given.124 
In order to protect any unwarranted intrusion, a similar consent requirement should be built in to 
BARR. The present method of disclosing flight data unless otherwise requested serves as implied 
consent instead of affirmatively-given consent, which is contrary to the standard treatment of 
consent in a privacy context.
125
 If aircraft owners had to submit a request to the FAA in order to 
have their movement information publicly disclosed, that would serve as their affirmative 
consent as is required by Fourth Amendment law.  
C. Corporate Aircraft Owners Ultimately Receive No Help From FOIA’s Exemption 4 
 
 Since corporate aircraft owners may not qualify for the same protections as individuals, 
either under the Privacy Act or the Fourth Amendment as discussed above,
126
 it is appropriate to 
analyze protection they may receive elsewhere. The primary reason corporations have an interest 
in the privacy of their aircraft movements is to ensure competitors and other interested parties do 
not use that information to destroy their competitive advantage.
127
 In fact, one commenter to the 
Proposed Rule, a corporation operating multiple brands of grocery stores in a variety of states, 
specifically noted that it uses BARR to keep “company and associate activities secure from 
competitive insight” while it “explore[s] areas for retail grocery development and travel to [] 
existing states of operation[.]”128 Although the information filed in flight plans does not include 
the purpose of the flight or the entity being visited, it is often easy to deduce this merely based on 
the destination airport.
129
 In fact, in an article and highly interactive website, the Wall Street 
Journal accomplishes exactly what this Note seeks to avoid: using the flight movement data 
                                                          
124
 Id. 
125
 Id. 
126
 See discussion of Privacy Act supra Part IIA. 
127
 Background of the BARR Program, supra note 19; see also Comments, supra note 37. 
128
 See Comment to Access to Aircraft Situation Display (ASDI) and National Airspace System Status Information 
(NASSI), 76 Fed. Reg. 12,209 (proposed Mar. 4, 2011) (comment of Delhaize America). 
129
 See, e.g., Maremont & McGinty, supra note 86. 
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obtained from the FAA, it was able to combine information about the owner with the aircraft 
history to create a profile of where the owner has travelled and why he was visiting there.
130
 An 
individual with this information regarding a corporate aircraft has the makings of a list of 
customers or suppliers of that company, which has already been found to constitute valid, 
protectable commercial information.
131
 
 FOIA exemption 4 excludes information from mandatory disclosure that consists of 
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.”132 This analysis will focus on the second class of exempted information,133 which 
includes material that meets the three prongs: 1) commercial or financial information; 2) 
obtained from a person; and 3) is privileged or confidential.
134
 The D.C. Circuit has noted that 
“Congress contemplated that Exemption 4 ‘would include business sales statistics, inventories 
[and] customer lists.’"135 Further, there is little debate among courts about whether customer lists 
are commercial information.  
 The analysis, then, focuses on the third prong; whether the customer lists at issue are 
privileged or confidential.
136
 The standard for assessing confidentiality, as followed by a 
                                                          
130
 Id.; see also David Yermack, Tailspotting: How Disclosure, Stock Prices And Volatility Change When CEOs Fly 
To Their Vacation Homes (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17940, 2012) (comparing corporate 
jet flight information from the FAA with public real estate records to determine when CEOs and other officers were 
visiting vacation homes, and subsequently comparing that information with stock prices and corporate  news 
disclosures). 
131
 In re Uniservices, 517 F.2d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1975); Alan E. Littmann, Comment, The Technology Split 
in Customer List Interpretation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1901, 1925 (2002). 
132
 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 
133
 Because the issue of whether customer lists qualify as trade secrets entails a largely factual analysis undertaken 
by the court on a case-by-case basis, this analysis will not focus on the possibility of companies’ customer lists 
qualifying for exemption 4 protection under the “trade secrets” class. 
134
 Getman v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Some courts have separated “trade 
secrets” into their own class, effectively not requiring a showing of the same three prongs to be protected under 
exemption 4. Id.  
135
 Greenberg v. Food & Drug Admin., 775 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1985), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 10 (emphasis added by the court). 
136
 See id.; see also United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978) (not upsetting the District 
Court’s jury instruction treating customer lists as commercial information by nothing that the lower court “instructed 
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majority of circuits,
137
 is found in National Parks v. Morton. This standard provides that 
information should be treated as “confidential or privileged” for purposes of FOIA’s exemption 
4 “if disclosure is likely to have either of the following effects: (1) to impair the Government's 
ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the 
competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained.”138 It is conceded 
that the government’s ability to continue to collect this information will not be impeded if BARR 
continues to operate as it does currently; the facts that filing the flight movement information is a 
prerequisite to flying in certain airspace, that the collection of flight information is necessary for 
safety reasons, and the lack of opposition to BARR in its current opt-out configuration shows the 
government’s continuing ability to collect the data. Therefore, the issue turns on whether the 
disclosure will cause substantial competitive harm to the disclosing companies.  
 To determine whether a disclosure will cause substantial competitive harm under this 
test, the Ninth Circuit stated that “the parties opposing disclosure need not show actual 
competitive harm. [] Rather, evidence revealing (1) actual competition; and (2) a likelihood of 
substantial competitive injury is sufficient to bring commercial information under Exemption 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the jury regarding the term ‘property’ and stated that it encompasses ‘confidential and nonpublic commercial 
information such as customer lists’”). 
137
 See generally 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1 
(1st Cir. 1983); Nadler v. FDIC, 92 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1996); United Tech. Corp. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
574 F. Supp. 86 (D. Del. 1983); Acumenics Research & Tech. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 843 F.2d 800 (4th 
Cir. 1988); Calhoun v. Lyng, 864 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1988); GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109 
(9th Cir. 1994); Anderson v. Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1990); Hustead v. Norwood, 529 F. 
Supp. 323 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
138
 Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit, 
followed by a District Court in the Eighth Circuit, has adopted a distinction between information provided 
voluntarily and involuntarily to the government, to be applied prior to reaching this test. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. NASA, 895 F. Supp. 319, 325 (D.D.C. 1995). McDonnell Douglas noted the National Parks standard is 
applicable if the information has been provided involuntarily, and a separate test as stated in Critical Mass Energy 
Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992),  applies if provided voluntarily. Mcdonnell Douglas, 895 F. Supp. at 
325. Because most jurisdictions ignore this distinction, and because filing the flight information via a fight plan is 
federally required in order to fly in certain airspace, this analysis focuses only on the relevant “involuntarily 
submitted” standard. 
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4.”139 It would be simple for most corporations to make a showing of “actual” competition, even 
by just providing a list of competitors. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit brushed off the first prong and 
focused its discussion on the likelihood of substantial injury.
140
 Typical destinations for a 
business jet include current and potential clients, vendors, suppliers, and any other type of 
partner, among others.
141
 Allowing third parties to track aircraft movements could substantially 
jeopardize a competitive advantage by providing an insight into current projects and clients.
142
  
Therefore, it is likely that there is adequate reason to treat the flight movement information as 
confidential, and allow it to be exempted from FOIA. 
In its Final Notice, the FAA expressly claimed that the movement information at issue is 
not considered “commercial” information under FOIA Exemption 4 and thus is not withheld.143 
To come to this conclusion, the FAA primarily relied on the reverse-FOIA case.
144
 There, the 
court held the list of tail numbers currently utilizing the BARR program was not commercial in 
nature.
145
 However, since it was not the issue before it, the court expressly declined to comment 
on whether Exemption 4 would apply if the actual movement data were included in the FOIA 
request.
146
 Once this tracking and movement information is added to the issue, the analysis 
                                                          
139
 GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Pub. Citizen Health 
Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1983) and Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. Block, 755 
F.2d 397, 399 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also Gulf & W. Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527 (D. C. Cir. 1980) (holding 
that it is not necessary to show actual competitive harm by release of the information to the public in order to qualify 
for the exemption. Actual competition and the likelihood of competitive harm are sufficient). 
140
 Id.at 1114. 
141
 Business Aircraft Uses, NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION (2012), http://www.nbaa.org/business-
aviation/uses/. 
142
 Id. 
143
 Final Rule, supra note 26 at 32261. 
144
 Id. The FAA also relies on another case; however the facts of that one are not relevant to this discussion. 
145
 NBAA v. FAA, 686 F. Supp. 2d 80. 
146
 Id. 
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would likely be different;
147
 thus, this case cannot be relied on as support for the contention that 
the flight data is not commercial in nature.  
 As the FAA noted in its Final Rule,
148
 the Supreme Court, in Federal Communications 
Commission v. AT&T (“FCC v. AT&T”), ruled that “personal privacy” as used in FOIA does not 
extend to corporations.
149
 However, the issue in FCC v. AT&T revolved around an interpretation 
of exemption 7(c), which prohibits disclosure of information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes in order to protect personal privacy.
150
 It is conceded that exemption 7(c) does not 
protect the disclosure of the movement data at the heart of BARR.
151
 In contrast, exemption 4 
does not say that protecting “an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” is an intended goal of 
the exemption.
152
 Rather, it aims to protect information “obtained from a person.” 153  The 
Supreme Court said in FCC v. AT&T that, as specified by Rules of Construction in the United 
States Code, the definition of “person” includes corporations.154 
 Therefore, the movement data pertaining to corporate aircraft should be protected under 
FOIA’s Exemption 4. This means that the FAA would not be required to disclose the 
information under the Act; however, CAN Financial v. Donovan
155
 has held that just because the 
government is not required to disclose information does not preclude the possibility that it is not 
permitted to do so.
156
 In fact, the Seventh Circuit has held that, even though the agency has “no 
                                                          
147
 See Comment to Access to Aircraft Situation Display (ASDI) and National Airspace System Status Information 
(NASSI), 76 Fed. Reg. 12,209 (proposed Mar. 4, 2011) (comment of the National Business Aviation Association). 
148
 Final Rule, supra note 26 at 32261. 
149
 FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1187.  
150
 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). 
151
 It is conceded that the movement data filed in flight plans is not primarily collected for “law enforcement 
purposes” as specified in exemption 7, which defeats any applicability even before reaching the issue of whether 
“personal privacy” should apply to corporations as discussed in FCC v. AT&T. While the information might 
sometimes be used in law enforcement, it is not the reason the information is collected. 
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 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 
153
 Id. 
154
 FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1182-83 (citing 1 U.S.C.S. § 1). 
155
 830 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
156
 Id.at 1144. 
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commitment to withhold the document[,] if the balance inclines in favor of protection, [] maybe 
such a commitment is implicit.”157 
 Even though the government cannot be required to maintain this information 
confidentially, it should still exercise its discretion to do so. A function of government is to 
protect the commercial interests of its industries. At the least, when deciding whether to release 
the movement information, the government should carefully balance the public benefit gained by 
release against the private commercial interests in keeping it private. In the present situation, 
there has been no showing by either the FAA or any other interested parties of a justifiable 
public interest in knowing where particular aircraft are at any given moment.
158
  
 When discussing the merits of releasing the location data, a handful of commentors on 
the Proposed Rule mentioned a shareholder’s interest in monitoring his corporation’s use of 
business aviation;
159
 however, concerns of this nature are not in the government’s interest and 
are best dealt with through disclosure methods internal to the corporation. Even a shareholder 
who could use the data to monitor his company’s aircraft would likely not want any potentially 
confidential information to be available publicly and to competitors, as that would also be 
harming his interests. 
 After all the relevant factors are weighted, there is ultimately no legal requirement, 
standard, or consequence for deciding either way. The FAA could reasonably decide that the 
current method of opting-in to BARR is sufficient to protect the concerns raised in the FOIA 
exemption 4 analysis;
160
 if a company does feel like it needs competitive protection, it has the 
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option of requesting it and being automatically granted.
161
 The same possibility of unforeseeable 
or unexpected invasions of their “privacy” that exists with, and should be protected for, private 
citizens
162
 does not have an equivalent here, as corporations should be able to tell prior to using 
an aircraft if they have destinations to be kept confidential. Combining the lack of an affirmative 
privacy requirement for corporations with the fact that corporations have the ability to anticipate 
their need for privacy, the existing “opt-out” system may sufficiently protect any rights owed to 
corporate owners, and any change would likely be unnecessary for the protection of their 
interests.  
D. Removing Tail Numbers as an Alternative to Changing BARR 
 
 If the FAA thinks it is too cumbersome to switch BARR from an opt-out system to an 
opt-in system, another option would be for it to remove the tail numbers from the data feed that 
is released to ASD subscribers such as FlightAware.com. An aircraft’s tail number, being 
equivalent to a vehicular license plate number, is the tag that connects the movement information 
to the individual owner.
163
 Removing this identifier would allow private aircraft owners to retain 
their privacy, and would also allow the FAA to achieve its desired goal in originally introducing 
the Proposed Rule: greater government openness.
164
 The practical result of this change would be 
that the public may still see where aircraft are located in the sky and how the (governmentally-
run) air traffic controllers are handling them, but would not be able to tell who owns any 
particular aircraft.
165
 Unfortunately, unless this system was also outfitted with an “opt-in” 
provision, it comes with a drawback: this alternative would remove the option of allowing an 
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owner to allow his movement data to be released. For example, one of the comments in support 
of the Proposed Rule mentioned that as a pilot and aircraft owner, he liked to have his family be 
able to see where he was flying, both for entertainment and to allow them to know when he 
would be home.
166
 This drawback, without the inclusion of an opt-in provision similar to the one 
discussed above, makes this option even less feasible.  
CONCLUSION 
 
 Even though this issue is not widely addressed in the media and affects a very small 
percentage of the country, it is nonetheless very important to those who are affected. Currently, 
BARR protects only aircraft owners who affirmatively request to have their location and 
movement data withheld from public disclosure. Those who do not make this request are subject 
to automatic disclosure until such a request is made, plus a month or so for processing time. This 
system is likely in violation of prevailing federal privacy law with regards to natural-person 
aircraft owners because of its method of disclosing unless requested otherwise. The Privacy Act, 
at the forefront of federal privacy law, allows for disclosure if affirmative consent has been given 
by the individual about whom the record is maintained. BARR should be amended to reflect the 
“consent” aspect of privacy law and switch to a system of requesting that certain aircraft records 
be released instead of requesting that they be withheld. Since there is already a mechanism in 
place for requests to be submitted, this option is extremely feasible. 
 Although there has been a large shift toward an attitude of open government with the 
current administration, there is still substantial government and legal interests in protecting 
personal privacy rights. Having owners affirmatively give their consent to disclosure is essential 
in the modern reality of ever-expanding technology. If the FAA is still interested in following the 
spirit of the open-government initiatives by releasing the aircraft movement information, as it 
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was when it published the Proposed Rule to amend BARR, it should consider removing the tail 
numbers from the data feed prior to granting public access to the ASDI system. Implementing 
this method would ultimately be the best way to balance individual privacy interests with the 
competing interest in government openness, the two factors whose balancing is really at the heart 
of all privacy and disclosure issues. 
